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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is a suit seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the amount of rent that must be paid 
under a 40 year ground lease agreement that began in 1983 (" 1983 Lease Agreement"). The 
lease was between one of Pocatello's fomler hospitals, Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC), as 
Lessor and owner of the land, and Sterling Development Co. (Sterling), as Lessee. Sterling 
constructed a building on the land. That building was used first as a behavioral health clinic and 
later as an assisted living facility. In 2002 IHC sold its Pocatello hospital and the ground where 
the assisted living facility is located to Bannock Regional Medical Center ("BRNIC"). In 2009 
PortneufMedical Center ("PMC") purchased those assets from BRlv1C and also assumed the 1983 
ground lease as Lessor. The assisted living center is now operated by Quail Ridge Medical 
Investors, LLC (Quail), which in 2001 assumed the 1983 Lease as Lessee. (Pocatello Medical 
Investors, LLC, an entity related to Quail, subleased the assisted living center from Sterling from 
1996 until Quail purchased the facility in 2001.) For convenience the former parties to the 1983 
Lease Agreement may be referred to in this brief simply as "hospital" and Quail's predecessors 
may be referred to as "tenant." 
The purpose of the suit was to seek a declaratory judgment regarding a provision in the 
1983 Lease that requires the tenant to pay rent in the amount of 15% of the fair market value of the 
leased land. The 1983 Lease also provides for the amount of the rent payment to be recalculated 
("adjusted") every 3 years to keep it at 15% of the land's fair market value. The issues relate to the 
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fact that the rent amount was not adjusted between 1983 and 2009, when PMC purchased assets 
from BRJ\tlC, within a few months after PMC's purchase, PMC realized that the assisted living 
center land value had increased significantly and that Quail was paying less than 1 % of the market 
value, not the required 15%. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
After a court trial, the court entered declaratory judgment finding that the correct amount of 
rent, based on 15% of the current fair market value of the property, is $148,500 per year. Quail 
had been paying only $9,562.50. The district court ordered Quail to make the higher rent 
payment retroactively starting in 2010, for a total rent payment of $416,812.50. The court also 
declared that the provisions requiring the rent to be adjusted every three years were still in effect, 
and that future adjustments must be made on or before February 1, 2013 and continuing every 
three years thereafter until the lease expires in 2023. Basically, the court enforced the Lease 
Agreement exactly as it is \vritten, which is for the rent to remain at 15% ofthe fair market value of 
the land. Quail is appealing that judgment, claiming that because PMC's predecessors' failed to 
increase the rent, the provisions of the 1983 Lease requiring rent to stay at 15% of market value 
have been waived or changed by course of conduct, or that an Estoppel Certificate from 2001 
modified the 1983 Lease and removed the 15% requirement, or, as a third alternate, that the court 
ignored certain lease agreement provisions which Quail feels, if applied as Quail had requested, 
would have resulted in a more favorable ruling for Quail. 
Respondent Brief 6 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts. 
PMC purchased the Pocatello hospital in 2009 from Bannock County. As part of that 
purchase, PMC took oyvnership of 4.25 acres of land next door to the hospital. Quail and its 
predecessors had been leasing this land since 1983 and at least since 1996 have operated an 
assisted living center out of a building owned by the tenant and constructed on the land. Thus, in 
2009 PMC became the ground lessor and Quail its lessee of the land under the 1983 Lease 
Agreement. Soon after the purchase, a PMC employee reviewed the 1983 Lease and saw that 
Quail was only paying rent of $9,562.50 per year, which seemed remarkably low, given that the 
land was worth approximately $1,000,000.00. The employee investigated further and learned 
that the rent had not been increased since the lease began in 1983. No one could explain why the 
rent had not been increased and the fact that it had not been increased was apparently due to a 
complete corporate oversight, probably due to no one being assigned the task of overseeing the 
rent adjustments. PMC had an appraisal done and confirmed that the value of the land had 
increased significantly from $63,750 in 1983 ($15,000 per acre times 4.25 acres) to $1,080,000 in 
2007 and then dropped to $990,000 by 2010. Simple math revealed that Quail was paying less 
than 1 % of the market value of the land, not the 15% that was required by the lease. 
Pursuant to the procedure set forth in the 1983 lease, which was to first attempt to agree in 
writing on the land's market value, PMC invited Quail to participate in the process of appraising 
the land as the first step toward reaching an agreement on an updated rent amount. Quail refused 
to participate, taking the position that it would not pay higher rent, would not return the enormous 
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windfall it had received during the years the rent amount had sunk far below the required 15%, and 
insisted that the rent payment had become locked in at the 1983 value, and that if the rent amount 
was to be changed, it should be lowered to an amount even lower than it was in 1983. This suit 
ensued and went to trial before the district court. 
After hearing all the evidence, the court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions oflaw. 
The court ruled that the 1983 Lease Agreement simply meant what it said: the rent payment is to 
be 15% of the land's market value and must be adjusted every three years to keep it at 15%. R. 
Vol. I, p. 188 at par. (11) and (12). 
D. Attorney Fees on Appeal 
PMC has two legal bases for seeking attorney fees. First, pursuant to statute and, second, 
because the 1983 Lease Agreement requires payment of attorney fees by the losing party. The 
statute, § 12-120(3), states: 
(3) In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to 
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the 
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
The statute is clear in its definition of a commercial transaction;" all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes." This suit concerns a commercial lease 
agreement and has nothing to do with personal or household purposes. Attorney fees must be 
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awarded, as in other cases dealing with commercial leases. Corder v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 1999, 
986 P.2d 1019, l33 Idaho 353 (1999), [tenant farmer who prevailed in breach of contract action 
against landlord was entitled to award of attorney fees pursuant to I. C. § 12-120(3)] ; and Herrick v. 
Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293,900 P.2d 201 (1995), [lease dispute concerning operation of cattle ranch 
upon which neither party maintained a home was a "commercial transaction" under § 12-120(3)]. 
Additionally, the 1983 Lease Agreement, which was the entire basis and subject of this 
dispute, provides that attorney fees shall be awarded: 
10.3 Attorney's Fees. In the event suit shall be brought for an unlawful detainer of 
the said premise, for the recovery of any rent due under the provisions of this lease, 
or because of the breach of any other covenant herein contained to be kept or 
performed, the prevailing party shall be paid a reasonable attorney's fee by the other 
party, and such attorney's fee shall be deemed to have accrued at the 
commencement of such action and shall be paid whether or not such action is 
prosecuted to judgment. 
PI. Exh. 101, at par. 10.3. Thus, it is doubly certain that PMC is entitled to have Quail pay its 
attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
This case is PMC's attempt to enforce the 1983 Lease Agreement. The applicable 
language is very simple: the annual rent payment shall be 15% ofthe market value of the land and 
shall stay at 15% of the land's market value by being adjusted every three years. PI. Exh. 10 1, at 
par. 1.3. Quail uses three approaches to keep the focus off the clear intent of the agreement. 
First, Quail asserts the doctrines of modification, waiver, estoppel, and course of dealing, which 
Respondent Brief 9 
are all based on the fact that the parties did not adjust the rent every three years between 1983 and 
2009. Quail claims this oversight caused the landlord to lose the right to charge rent at 15% of the 
land's value. Second, Quail claims the 2001 Estoppel Certificate rewrote the 1983 lease 
agreement and did away with the 15% requirement. Third, Quail asks the court to ignore the 
lease's unambiguous statement that the rent amount shall be 15% of the land's value and focus only 
on guidelines for adjusting the rent, the "taking into account" language, which Quail feels would 
mandate that the land's value remain at its 1983 value of $15,000 per acre, or even become a lower 
valuation than in 1983. All three of Quail's arguments to avoid its obligation to pay the required 
15% fail: The legal and equitable arguments fail because Quail skips over essential elements of 
each legal and equitable doctrine; the 2001 Estoppel Certificate does not re"'Tite the 1983 Lease 
Agreement, but rather specifically states that it leaves the terms and conditions of the 1983 lease in 
full force and effect. Additionally, Quail's contract interpretation fails because any plain reading 
of the lease agreement results in the obvious conclusion that the rent must remain at 15% of market 
value. The court chose not to ignore the primary language of the lease agreement and required that 
the rent be restored to 15% of the land's current value. The court further ordered that the amount 
be adjusted every three years until 2023 when the lease terminates. R. Vol. I, p. 188 and 201. 
Detailed Fact Statement 
The most basic fact of this case is the actual language of the 1983 Lease Agreement, which 
states in part: 
1.3 Rent and Payment Thereof. 
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(a) Rental. Lessee shall pay the following annual rental amount: 
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent 
(15%) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3) 
years from the Commencement date of this Lease, the leased land shall be 
valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($15,000 .00) per 
acre. 
(b) Adjustments Based on Property Value. The annual rental as set forth above 
shall be adjusted every three (3) years beginning on the Commencement Date of 
this Lease, referred to below as the adjustment date. 
The parties wTitten agreement within ninety (90) days before the applicable 
rent adjustment date shall be a conclusive determination between the parties of the 
fair market value for the period to which the adjustment applies .... 
The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair 
market value of the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the premises. 
Thus, the annual rent payment is, and shall remain at, 15% of the value of the leased land. ,. PI. 
Exh. 101 at par. 1.3(a). The lease states that the land's value in 1983 was $15,000 per acre. Basic 
arithmetic was used to determine the initial rent amount of $9,562.50. ($15,000 times 4.2 acres 
times 15% equals $9562.50.) Findings of Fact, par. (10) and (11), R. VoL I, p. 178. The lease 
then states that the rent amount shall be "adjusted every three (3) years" so that, "the rent as 
adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the leased land." PI. 
Exh. 101, at par. 1.3(b). This is the primary governing language that sets the amount of the rent 
payments and tells the parties what the rent must be during the term of the lease. R. VoL I, p. 187, 
par. (10). The court ruled that this lease language was "legally binding" and constituted a "valid 
Lease Agreement" between PMC and Quail. R. Vol. I, p. 187, par. (5) and (6). The court found 
this portion of the lease agreement to be unambiguous and enforced it as written. R. Vol. I, p. 
187, par. (8) through (12). 
Respondent Brief 11 
The lease's requirement that rent be set at, and remain at, 15% of market value is followed 
by instructions on how to make the three year adjustments. These instructions are at the bottom of 
paragraph L3(b): 
(b) 
The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of 
the fair market value of the leased land, exclusive of the 
improvements on the premises. Determination offair market 
value shall be based on the highest and best use of the land on 
the applicable rent adjustment date without taking the 
leasehold into account. The determination shall take into 
account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is 
the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value of 
Fifteen Thousand and No/JOO Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre 
and shall also take into account any determinations of market 
value made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for 
periods preceding the applicable rent adjustment date. 
These instructions have three parts. The first sentence states in mandatory language that the 
valuation must not include the improvements on the land; in other words the valuation does not 
include Quail's building, the assisted living center. The second sentence is also in mandatory 
language and states that the land shall be valued at its highest and best use without considering the 
presence of the assisted living center. The court heard testimony from PMC's expert witness, 
Brad Janoush, on these first two mandatory instructions and found that PMC's appraisal was 
indeed based on only the land, not the building, and that the appraisal was as medical property, 
which is the land's highest and best use, based on the hospital and numerous medical offices that 
have been built in the area. R. Vol. I, p. 194, par. (25). Janoush' testimony enabled the court to 
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find that PMC's appraisal was the best evidence of the fair market value of the property and the 
court used the value stated in that appraisal to determine the new rent amount. 
The third sentence of instructions is different than the first two sentences in that it uses the 
phrase "take into account." It instructs the parties to "take into account" the original $15,000 per 
acre value from 1983 as well as any subsequent adjustments. The court ruled prior to trial that 
this section of the lease agreement was ambiguous and invited evidence to help the court 
understand the parties intentions on how to "take into account." However, very little if any useful 
evidence was offered at trial by either party to assist the court in discovering the parties' intent for 
the "taking into account" language. The court found that the evidence was contradictory and 
speculative and of no value. R. Vo. I, p. 192 - 195. Ultimately, the court determined that the 
third instruction was of no help in making the adjustment and disregarded it. R. Vo. I, p. 195, 
page 28. Indeed there was no evidence at all with regard to the "take into account" language. 
Because the court did not have any facts to tell it how to "take into account" the original land value 
of$15,000, the court proceeded to set the rent at 15% of the land's current market value, based on 
the appraisal done by Janoush. 
Quail brings this appeal arguing that the trial court erred by enforcing the language 
requiring that rent be 15% of the land's value. Quail insists that the court should have elevated 
the third instruction, the "take into account" sentence, and made this sentence the prime directives 
of the agreement, essentially doing away with the 15% requirement. Quail wishes that its rent 
payments will remain at less than one percent (1 %) of the fair market value the land, creating for 
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itself an enormous windfall as it occupies valuable commercial property while paying rent based 
on the land's 1983 value. 
In addition to asking the district court to rewTite the lease and do away with the 15% 
requirement, Quail asserts legal and equitable arguments including modification, waiver, estoppel 
and course of dealing. All of these amount to one point: Quail believes that since the hospital did 
not raise the rent for the first 27 years of the lease, that it lost the right to raise the rent any time 
thereafter. 
Fortunately, the 1983 lease tells the parties exactly what to do if the rent is not adjusted in 
writing every three years. The 1983 Lease Agreement instructs the parties: 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment date, 
lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the 
adjusted rate is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the determination, 
pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment. 
PI. Exh. 101, par. 1.3, last paragraph. This simple language governs the district court's ruling in 
this case. It does not contain a time requirement and read literally, the adjustment can be made at 
any time, with the difference to paid promptly after the adjustment has occurred. The district 
court found that the rent adjustment had not been made for the period between 20 10 and 20 13, so it 
made the adjustment based on the fair market value stated in the appraisal, and ordered Quail to 
"promptly" pay the difference. 
As part of its legal and equitable arguments, Quail claims that an Estoppel Certificate 
signed in 200 1 constitutes a modification of the lease agreement and does away with the 
Respondent Brief 14 
requirement that rent remain at 15% of market value. Quail makes this argument even though the 
2001 Estoppel Certificate expressly states that it does not modify the 1983 Lease and even though 
the 2001 Estoppel Certificate contains no terms whatsoever that could be read as modifying the 
1983 Lease. Rather, Quail points out that the 2001 Estoppel Certificate does not repeat the 1983 
Lease's requirement that the rent be adjusted every three years, and therefore, Quail insists that the 
parties in 2001 must have meant to modify the 1983 Agreement to do away with the 15% 
requirement as well as the 3 year adjustment requirement. The district court ruled that the 2001 
Estoppel Certificate was not ambiguous and required no parole evidence to interpret its terms. 
The court rejected the subjective evidence offered by Quail's main witness, Robert Faulkner, who 
testified about his thought processes in helping to draft the 2001 Estoppel Certificate. Faulkner, 
who was and is Quail's in-house counsel, admitted that he did not discuss modifying the 1983 lease 
with the hospital, but stated that he assumed that, by not mentioning that the rent could be 
increased every three years, the parties had done away with the requirement. This argument 
simply makes no sense and the district court did not hesitate in rejecting it. 
From PMC's perspective there has been an expensive oversight that cost it and its 
predecessors hundreds of thousands of dollars. PMC cannot make up for all of that loss, at least 
not for the time before it realized the oversight in 2009, but from that point on the court ordered 
that the rent be paid at the correct amount, which is 15% of the land's current market value. The 
court recognized the unjust nature of Quail's effort to continue taking advantage of the hospital's 
oversight and ordered that the agreement be enforced as written. 
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A. Standard of Review 
The standard of revie\v stated Quail's brief is accurate. Simply put, if there was 
substantial evidence to support the district court's findings of fact, such findings must not be 
disturbed on appeaL Likewise, if the district court correctly stated the law, the conclusions of law 
will also stand. 
B. Quail did not establish the elements of modification; Quail did not offer any evidence 
that the hospital took part in a modification. 
Quail claims modification as an affirmative defense. A modification of a contract 
requires an offer, acceptance, a meeting of the minds, and consideration. Afitchell v. Pacific First 
Bank, 130 Or. App. 65, 75, 880 P.2d 490 (1994). The requirements of modification are identical 
to the requirements of a contract Schwinder v. Austin Bank c<lChicago, 348 Ill.App.3d 461,809 
N.E.2d 180, 188 (1 st Dist. 2004). The burden of proof was on Quail to prove the elements of a 
modified contract Quail relies on the recent case of Watkins, which states: 
As with all modifications, the terms of a contract cannot be altered by one party 
without the other party's approval. Additionally, the minds of the parties must meet 
as to the proposed modification ... The fact of agreement may be implied from a 
course of conduct in accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from 
the acts of one party in accordance with the terms of a change proposed by the 
other. Whether an alleged modification is proven is one for the trier of the facts to 
decide. The district court found no evidence that the parties reached an agreement 
or meeting of the minds, and stated that the course of conduct in this case did not 
establish a modification. 
Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 152 Idaho 531, 536,272 P.3d 503,508 (2012). Just as in Watkins, 
the district court in this case found that Quail had offered no evidence of a meeting of the minds 
between the hospital and QuaiL Conclusions of Law, par. 34, R. Vol. I, p. 196. All of the 
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evidence offered by Quail was to the effect that Quail may have believed that since the hospital 
was not increasing the rent, that it was losing its right to ever increase the rent. Instead, the court 
found that the hospital had "entirely forgotten" about raising the rent and that the lease had been 
"poorly managed." The court also held that this forgetfulness and poor management did not 
modify the lease. Conclusion of Law 22, at R. Vol. I, p. 193. 
With no evidence that the hospital ever intended to do away with the rent increase 
provisions, Quail asks this court to consider whether the 2001 Estoppel Certificate might 
constitute a modification of the 1983 Lease Agreement. However, Quail ignores the actual 
language of the 2001 Estoppel Certificate, which repeatedly states that the 1983 Ground Lease is 
not being modified: 
(i) Tenant [Quail's predecessor] intends to assign its rights in the Ground Lease with 
Landlord (PMC's predecessor] to the Successor Tenant [Quail], and Successor Tenant 
[Quail] intends to assume any and all obligations of Ten ant [Quail's predecessor] under the 
[1983] Ground Lease. 
Def. Exh. 228, page 1. The 2001 Estoppel Certificate goes further, reinforcing that it is in no way 
intended to modify the 1983 Ground Lease: 
2. The Lease is in full force and effect, is valid and enforceable in accordance with its 
terms and has not been terminated. Except as otherwise referenced herein, the Lease 
constitutes the only agreement of any kind or nature between the Landlord and the Tenant 
relating to the Demised Premises [the 4.25 acres ofland]. 
Def. Exh. 228, page 2. The 2001 Estoppel Certificate again reinforces the fact that it is not a 
modification: 
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In addition, Successor Tenant and Subtenant hereby join and agree, as tenantsllessees, to 
be bound by, as except as otherwise specified herein, the tenns and conditions of the 
Ground Lease as if they were parties hereto. 
Def. Exh. 228, page 3. Finally, the 2001 Estoppel Certificate continues: 
Landlord's consent to the assignment and assumption and/or to the sublease as set forth 
herein shall not constitute or be construed as ... , (b) a waiver or modification by Landlord 
of the Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease, or excuse Tenant's perfonnance of 
any tenn or condition of the Lease, and/or (c) a waiver or modification by Landlord of any 
of its rights under the Lease ... 
Def. Exh. 228, page 4. Despite the fact that the 2001 Estoppel Certificate states four times that it 
is not a modification, Quail insists it is a modification. 
Even more incredibly, Quail insists the modification was made, not by directly stating what 
the modification would be, but by the fact that Quail's in-house attorney, Robert Faulkner, 
removed a sentence that would have reminded the hospital that the rent needed to be adjusted 
every three years. In 1996 IHC had signed another estoppel certificate in favor of Quail's related 
company, Pocatello Medical Investors, LLC. The 1996 version had included a reminder that the 
rent would be adjusted every three years. Faulkner removed that reminder when he drafted the 
2001 version. 
Note that the 1983 lease does not impose on the hospital the obligation to "adjust" the rent; 
it is a mutual obligation of both the tenant and the landlord. The language makes it clear that the 
original parties expected the adjustment to be done by simple agreement every three years. 
Guidelines were set in place to make the adjustment simple and inexpensive. Both parties had an 
obligation to participate in the process. Instead, Quail, through the testimony of its attorney, 
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Faulkner, reveals that Quail was aware of the requirement to raise the rent in 2001, but remained 
silent, choosing to take advantage of the hospital's mistake as long as possible. Faulkner even 
admits to removing language from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate to facilitate the oversight and to 
ensure that the hospital did not become aware of the rent adjustment language. In its brief Quail 
quotes Faulkner, but carefully omits the previous 5 lines of testimony, where Faulkner admits that 
it was he, not the hospital, that omitted from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate any mention of the fact 
that the rent had to be adjusted every three years, even though it had been in the 1996 Estoppel 
Certificate: 
Q. (By Mr. Gaffuey) ... Now, the language talking about rent adjustment that 
appears in the' 96 estoppel certificate is not in this certificate (the 2001 certificate] 
here? 
A. (Faulkner) That's correct. I did not include it in the first draft [of the 2001 
certificate] . 
(Tr. Vol. II, 166:2-6.) Note that Faulkner goes on to say he talked to "the folks at Sterling 
Development Group" about the fact that the rent had never been increased. Sterling, however, 
was not part of the hospital; Sterling was the previous tenant, and was Quail's predecessor in 
interest. Faulkner did not discuss the change with anyone from the hospital's side of the 
transaction. He unilaterally decided to leave out any reference to adjusting the rent. He states 
that "we" wanted to "put to bed" what the rent would be. The "we" he refers to is the people at 
Quail, not people from the hospital. Tr. Vol. II, 168, L. 3. He then gloats that the hospital's 
attorney, Mr. Kroesche, failed to notice that the language was removed and did not ask for any 
revisions to the missing language. Tr. Vol. II, p. 17, L. 23. Quail now asks this court to accept 
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the notion that because the hospital did not object to Mr. Faulkner omitting the adjustment 
reminder from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate, that absence of objection could be used as proof that 
the 2001 Estoppel Certificate did away with the requirement that rent would stay at 15% of land 
value. Fortunately, the law does not reward such behavior. Modification, waiver, and estoppel 
all require action and intent on the part of PMC' s predecessors as an element of those doctrines. 
At trial there was no evidence whatsoever that the hospital did anything to modify the agreement, 
to waive the agreement, or to create reliance on the part of Quail. By the end of Faulkner's direct 
examination it was clear that he had no evidence of anything done by the hospital to create a 
modification, waiver, or estoppel. Because of the absence of such testimony, there was no need to 
even cross examine him and PMC declined to question him. 
The district court rejected Faulkner's testimony of his own "subjective intent" in deleting 
the language that had been in the 1996 Estoppel Certificate, without discussing the change with the 
hospital or its attorney. The court stated: 
The court would suggest that removing language that was present in an earlier 
document and not discussing the same or making the other party aware of its 
deletion does not establish 'mutual assent.' In fact, some might question the 
propriety of such conduct." 
Conclusions of Law, Par. 35, R. Vol. I, p.197. The court correctly rejected the notion that the 
2001 Estoppel Certificate constitutes a modification of the 1983 Lease Agreement. 
It would have been easy for Quail and the hospital, if they wished to do away with the 
requirement that the rent stay at 15% of the land's value, to simply state in a written document that 
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the parties were doing away with the requirement and that the rent would stay at the 1983 amount 
until 2023. No such statement was wTitten, and no discussion ever occurred between the parties 
regarding such a change. It would be extremely odd to put such a modification in an estoppel 
certificate, given the fact that the estoppel certificate states that it contains no modifications. 
Additionally, Guy Kroesche, the hospital's lawyer in 2001, testified that he had never in his years 
of practice used an Estoppel Certificate to modify a lease agreement. R. Vol. II, p. 302, L. 13. It 
would have made much more sense to simply draft a new lease agreement or at least an 
amendment to the lease agreement, for such an important change. 
Quail errs in relying on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 202(4), which 
states in its comments that the rules are to "serve merely as guides in the process of interpreting" 
the words of a contract. Quail claims that § 202(4) allows a ne\v contract to be wTitten merely by 
a course of conduct. That is a severe misapplication of the rule. The 2001 Estoppel Certificate is 
not ambiguous and did not need to be interpreted. Quail's argument fails, first, because the 2001 
Estoppel Certificate is not ambiguous and therefore court interpretation is not appropriate in any 
case, and secondly, even ifthe document were ambiguous, conduct can only be used to interpret 
the language in the 2001 Estoppel Certificate, not to create a modification out of thin air. 
Note that Quail points to the fact that no adjustment was made between 2001 and 2009 as 
proof that the 2001 Estoppel Certificate really was a modification. This argument fails. A 
course of conduct may be relied on to interpret ambiguous language in a modified agreement. 
Here, there was no finding that the 2001 Estoppel Certificate was ambiguous, thus, a course of 
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conduct of not adjusting the rent every three years between 2001 and 2010 should not have been 
considered at all, particularly where all of the evidence indicated that not adjusting continued to be 
due to oversight, not due to a modification made in the 2001 Estoppel Certificate. 
Quail also errs in relying on Lakeview }vianagement, Inc. v Care Realty, LLC, 2009 WL 
903818 (D.N.H. 2009). The significant difference is that in Lakeview there was evidence of an 
actual conversation between the parties in which they agreed to modify the manner in which the 
amount of rent would be calculated. There was also evidence in Lakeview that the parties had 
actually put the modification terms in writing, but the wTitten documents were lost. The facts in 
Lakeview are long and complex, but it is clear that the Lakeview parties were dealing with each 
other in writing and also having discussions about the modification issues. Lakeview's facts are 
completely different than the hospital's dealings with Quail, where there 'were no discussions or 
correspondence of any type about a modification to do away with the 15% of value rent provisions. 
The evidence at trial is clear that any intention to modify the 1983 Lease was entirely unilateral on 
Quail's part; the hospital was never involved in any modification of the agreement. The first time 
the idea of modification ever came up between the hospital and Quail was after litigation began in 
2009. Lakeview is off point because its facts included evidence of a meeting of the minds 
between both parties. 
Quail cites numerous cases on the purpose and effect of an Estoppel Certificate. PMC 
agrees with those quotes but points out that each statement is irrelevant to this case. For instance, 
it is agreed that an estoppel certificate binds the signatory to the statements made. However, this 
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is irrelevant; the 2001 Estoppel Certificate makes no mention of modifying the rent amount. It 
contains no statement upon which Quail could have relied to believe the rent amount had been 
modified, especially in light of the four statements in the document that unequivocally state that 
the 1983 lease remains in full force and effect according to its terms. If Quail had wanted to make 
clear that there was a modification on rent adjustment, it should have insisted on language that 
would have made an exception to those four statements. Instead, the 2001 Estoppel Certificate 
mentions rent only to acknowledge that rent was currently at $9,562.50 and that rent in that amount 
had been paid and no rent payments were due. This was a true statement. The Estoppel 
Certificate makes no statement that the parties agreed to do away with the requirement that the rent 
payment be 15% of market value. 
Toward the end of its argument on modification Quail suggests that Forrest Preston's 
signature on a personal guarantee for the rent payment is consideration for the agreement to do 
away with the requirement that rent be 15% of market value. This is untrue. Preston's signature 
was required because the previous guarantors were being released from their obligations and 
Preston was to become the new guarantor. Def. Ex. 211. There is no evidence that the hospital 
sought the guarantee as consideration for agreeing to modify the rent amount. 
Although not clearly articulated, Quail takes the position that the 1996 Estoppel Certificate 
constitutes an agreement that the land value was $15,000 per acre and that it amounts to a 
preceding rent adjustment that the court should have taken into account. Quail says this "rent 
adjustment" occurred because the "rent remained static:' Not changing the rent is different than 
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going through the adjustment process. The lease clearly states that adjustments be put in writing. 
Note that 1996 was not an adjustment year, and the 1996 Estoppel Certificate mentions that the 
rent would be adjusted in 1998. Thus, the 1996 Estoppel Certificate was not a preceding 
adj ustment and is not something the district court should have taken into account in determining 
the value of the land in 2010. 
The lease establishes that the parties are to adjust the rent every three years and that their 
"agreement in wTiting" shall be binding. Other than the lease agreement itself, there has never 
been an "agreement in writing" on the value of the land. Quail, however, seeks a ruling that by 
saying nothing and doing nothing, about rent adjustment over the years the parties had in effect 
agreed that the rent should remain the same. To some extent that is true and PMC did not seek to 
have the rent increased for the period between 1983 and 2007. Where the parties really differ is 
that Quail insists that by not reaching an agreement in writing every three years the hospital 
waived the right to ever increase the rent That is not fair and does not make sense. The] 983 
Lease agreement is very clear that rent is to be 15% of the land's value and the terms of the lease 
allow for retroactive adjustment, as stated in the tlnal paragraph of 1.3(b) of the lease agreement. 
(Quoted above.) The right to adjust the rent has never been modified or waived by any conduct of 
the hospital. The court in this case simply enforced the lease agreement as wTitten, fitting it to the 
current land value, and bringing the payment back to 15% of land value, rather than the less than 
1 % Quail had been paying. 
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The court made the adjustment without any solid explanation for why the rent had not 
increased during the first 26 years. There was some evidence that the land value had not 
increased significantly until 2000. Tracy Farnsworth, IHC's CEO of the hospital in 2001 and 
2003, and during the time when the 2001 Estoppel Certificate was signed, testified that he was 
completely unaware of the rent adjustment provisions. Tr. Vol. II, p. 210, L 21. - p. 212, L 10. 
There was no contrary evidence to cast doubt on the court's conclusion that the failure to adjust the 
rent was due to the hospital's oversight, poor management, corporate forgetfulness. Conclusion 
of Law (22), R. VoL II, p. 192 - 193. The law is clear that an oversight cannot modify an 
agreement; an oversight cannot create a waiver; an oversight cannot create the reliance necessary 
to estop the enforcement of a lease; and an oversight is not a course of conduct that would reV\Tite 
a contract. This is because modifying a contract requires intent to modify and, by definition, an 
oversight or mistake is something that occurs without intent 
Thus, the only evidence Quail had of modification was Faulkner's admission that he 
removed a sentence from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate that had been in the 1996 Estoppel 
Certificate. The district court took a dim view of this behavior. Regardless of the ethics of the 
Faulkner's conduct, the fact remains that the 2001 Estoppel Certificate does not contain any 
language that modifies the 1983 lease agreement in any way that would do away with the 15% 
requirement or the requirement to adjust every three years. There is nothing in the 2001 Estoppel 
Certificate to be interpreted and no reason to consider a course of conduct to explain the language 
of a modification that does not exist. 
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In short, the 2001 Estoppel Certificate does not contain any modification language. 
Further, it is not ambiguous and parole evidence should not be considered to interpret it. The 
district court correctly rejected the modification argument. 
C. Quail did not establish the essential elements of a waiver and the court properly ruled 
that no waiver occurred. 
As with the modification argument, Quail prefers to simply ignore the elements of waiver. 
Quail begins this section of its brief appropriately by correctly stating part of the law of waiver in 
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 259 P.3d 595,604(2011), which is that waiver can only be inferred 
from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive; however, Quail cites to no 
evidence that the hospital made any "clear and unequivocal act" showing it intended to waive the 
right to increase the rent to keep it at 15% of the land's value. Other than the fact that it was not 
adjusted, which the court found was due to poor management and forgetfulness, there is no 
evidence of a knowing intentional waiver of the right to keep the rent payment at 15% of market 
value. Quail, finding no support in contract law for the notion that failing to enforce a contract 
creates a waiver, turns to criminal law, and then to appellate rules. Quail first points out that a 
criminal defendant may waive defenses if the rights are not asserted in a jury triaL Quail then 
points out that during an appeal a party waives any arguments it does not include in its opening 
brief. This desperate attempt to rewrite contract law by pulling from criminal law and appellate 
rules fails because criminal law and the rules of appellate procedure have nothing to do with 
contractual waiver. Quail'S bold assertion that waiver of rights under the law is the same as 
waiver of contractual rights is just plain wrong. 
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The correct statement of contract law is that a clear intention to waive must be shown to 
establish waiver of a contractual right. Knipe, 259 P.3d at 603. The contractual right must be 
kno~n and must be voluntarily relinquished. Evidence that a contractual right was not being 
enforced could support an argument of waiver, but it cannot be the only evidence of a waiver. 
Dennett v. Kuenzli, 131 Idaho 21, 936 P.2d 219 (1997) citing Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 
731,734,639 P.2d 429,432 (1981.) All of the evidence supports the court's conclusion that the 
rent was not raised after 2001 due to oversight and mistake, not by any intention to give up a 
known right. (See modification argument, above.) Even if Quail is given every benefit possible 
by claiming that the hospital waived its right to increase the rent for an adjustment period each 
time it neglected to do so, this does not establish that the hospital could never raise the rent. (In 
fact the Court gave Quail that favorable interpretation of the lease agreement by rejecting PMC's 
request that the rent be retroactively adjusted back to 2007. The court reached that result on 
grounds that the landlord did not try to adjust the rent until 2009 and had waived the 2007 to 2010 
period.) 
There is some evidence that between 1983 and 2000 the hospital saw no need to raise the 
rent. See Conclusions of Law, footnote 20, R. Vol. I, p. 195. Choosing not to raise the rent for a 
particular adjustment period has nothing to with an intent to never raise the rent. Earl Christensen 
also testified that the land values went up sharply after 2000 when the area began to be heavily 
developed with commercial and medical buildings. However, during this time the hospital was 
oblivious to its right to increase rent to keep up with the escalating land values. See Conclusions 
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of Law, par. 22, 27, and footnote 20, R. Vol. I, p. 192 - 195. The court ruled that due to this 
failure, PMC could not go back retroactively to the year 2007, as it had requested, but only to 20 10, 
the year PMC requested that Quail participate in the rent adjustment process. However, failing to 
raise the rent is completely different than manifesting an intent to nullify the contractual language 
requiring that the rent be 15% ofthe land value or nullifying the right in the future to raise the rent 
to match the increases in the land's value. Proof of such intention is entirely lacking. The 
district court ruled correctly in rejecting the waiver argument. 
D. The 2001 Estoppel Certificate does not estop PMC from enforcing it 1983 Lease 
Agreement 
Quail's estoppel argument is essentially a repeat of portions of its modification argument. 
Quail accuses the court of ignoring the "plain language" of the 200 1 Estoppel Certificate. Quail 
fails to identify where such "plain language" is because such "plain language" does not exist. It 
simply does not state anywhere that it is modifying the 1983 lease agreement to do away with the 
requirement that the rent amount is 15% of market value. Rather, as previously stated, the 2001 
Estoppel Certificate makes clear that the certificate is not intended to modify the 1983 Lease 
Agreement. It is true that the 2001 Estoppel Certificate states that "the Tenant is obligated to pay 
rent at the rate of $9,562.50 per annum" and that "rent has been paid through and including 
February 28, 2001." These are true statements. The rent amount was not adjusted and was still 
at $9,562.50 and the rent payment was current. This has nothing to do with modifying the express 
language of the 1983 Lease Agreement. PMC was not in 2001, and is not now, seeking to 
increase the rent for the year 2001 and the statements made by the hospital in 2001 remain as a true 
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certificate of the facts that existed in 2001. But the statements made have nothing to do with 
whether all future rent increases were waived and could not reasonably have been relied on by 
Quail to believe the rent would never be adjusted. 
The 1983 Lease foresees a time when the three year adjustment is not made and instructs 
the parties what to do: 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment date, 
lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the 
adjusted rate is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the determination, 
pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment. 
PI. Exh. 101, at par. 10.3. Thus, the 1983 Lease contemplates exactly what happened. No 
adjustment had been made by 2001 and Quail was required to pay the rate from the preceding 
period and it made that payment. The 2001 Estoppel Certified verifies that this was true. But it 
says nothing about doing away with the requirement that the rent be 15% of the land value, and it 
does not state that the rent can never be adjusted, instead it verifies that all of the terms and 
conditions of the 1983 Lease remain in force. 
The 2001 Estoppel Certificate repeatedly referred to the 1983 Ground Lease, 
incorporated its terms, and gave assurance that it did not modify or change the terms. Anyone 
reading it would know to rely on the language of the 1983 Ground Lease, not on the Estoppel 
Certificate to understand the terms of the lease. 
E. The district court correctly interpreted the 1983 Ground Lease to require that rent be 
15% of the value of the land. 
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Quail accuses the court of ignoring the "take into account" provision of the agreement and 
claims that if the court had followed the correct rules of interpretation of contracts, as stated in the 
Restatement of Contracts, it would have interpreted the 1983 Lease Agreement in a manner much 
more favorable to QuaiL Both arguments are wrong. Had the court followed Quail's advice, it 
would have ignored instead the primary language of the contract, which is the requirement that 
rent stay at 15% of market value. Following Quail's proposed interpretation would have been a 
blatant re-writing of the 1983 Lease Agreement. Likewise, because the parts of the contract that 
governed the outcome of the case, were clear and unambiguous, the court correctly refused to 
elevate the course of conduct (of not increasing the rent) in order to re'WTite the 1983 Lease 
Agreement and do away with the rent increase requirements. Finally, the "take into account" 
language is precatory wording, meaning that it is in the nature of advice or a suggestion, not 
necessarily a requirement that must strictly be obeyed. As such, the court was correct to pay little 
heed to the "take into account" language. 
(1) The court was correct to not make the "taking into account" language the primary 
focus of its interpretation. 
Although PMC believed the 1983 Lease was clear and unambiguous, and filed for a 
summary judgment interpretation and enforcement of the lease, the court determined that one 
sentence of the agreement was ambiguous. This sentence requires the parties, when adjusting the 
rent every three years, to "take into account" the original 1983 land value of$15,000 per acre and 
"also take into account" any other determinations of value that had been made preceding the 
adjustment period then being considered. Because of this ambiguity, the court ruled that a court 
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trial would be required to hear evidence that would explain the intent of the parties in 1983 
regarding the insertion of the "take into account" language into the lease. However, neither party 
had any evidence on this issue. The court was left with some speculation and some contradictory 
testimony from former hospital administrators about how the parties arrived at the 1983 land 
valuation and why thereafter the rent was not adjusted. (PMC offered the testimony of Charles 
Anton that the hospital had recently bought the land in 1983 and would have knmvn its value at 
that time based on the purchase price, and Earl Christensen speculated that the land did not rise in 
value enough to matter until after the 90's.) The court found that there was no persuasive 
evidence to explain the intent of the "taking into account" language and yet the court had to 
interpret the lease anyway. The court chose to go with the clear, basic language of the agreement, 
which requires that the rent be 15% of the land's value throughout the term of the lease. 
Quail's main challenge on the court's interpretation of the lease is that the district court 
should have made the ambiguous language, the "taking into account" guidelines, the main focus of 
its interpretation. When the trial was over the court had been given no evidence from either party 
about how to "take into account" the original valuation, which was the only valuation undertaken 
by the parties before 2009. Interestingly, had the parties met in 2009 to discuss land value for the 
2010 adjustment period, they would have been in the same situation as the court: neither party 
knew the exact reason their predecessors had for choosing $15,000 as the starting value per acre of 
the land and neither party was aware of any written preceding valuations to take into account. 
Thus, the parties, would have had to ignore the taking into account guidelines because the 
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guidelines had become useless after more than 25 years. With no useful way to apply the 
guidelines the parties would have to have simply relied on the primary language of the contract, 
that the rent be set at 15% of the land's value and would have done exactly what the judge did: 
rely on a current determination of market value. 
Quail is upset that the judge ignored the "take into account" guidelines, but instead of 
suggesting how the guidelines might have been taken into account to arrive at fair market value, 
insisted that the court should have elevated the guidelines and made them the primary focus of the 
lease agreement. That does not make sense. Indeed, had the court done this, it would have 
actually done what Quail accuses the court of doing, writing a new contract. The court would 
have taken a contract that requires rent to be at, and remain at, 15% of land value and replaced it 
with a fixed term agreement to keep the rent the same for the duration oflease. 
Quail's final complaint is that the judge should have actually reduced the amount of rent. 
Basically, Quail contends that the court should have assumed that a valuation was done in 2007 
(ignoring the requirement that valuations be "in wTiting"), and that the valuation resulted in an 
agreement that the land was worth $15,000 per acre, and then reduced the value in 2010, due to the 
recession. This does not make sense in light of the written procedure for adjusting the rent, as 
stated in the lease: 
The annual net rental as set forth above [15% of fair market value] shall be adjusted 
every three years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to below as 
the rent adjustment date. 
The parties' written agreement within ninety (90) days before the applicable rent 
adjustment date shall be a conclusive determination between the parties of the fair makret 
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value for the period to which the adjustment applies .... 
Thus, the 1983 lease contemplates the parties first attempting to agree on what the ne\v fair market 
value of the land is. This would involve an actual valuation of the property. The court correctly 
found that no valuation had occurred. The parties had never "agreed in writing" on a new land 
value. Without an agreement in writing, no valuation had occurred, and the court had no 
"preceding" adjustment to take into account. Quail argues that the district court should have 
ignored the fact that valuations had to be written agreements of value and engage in the fiction that 
each time the parties failed to even discuss a value, never mind putting it in writing, that a 
valuation occurred anyway. No valuation ever occurred, and the court was correct in finding that 
there was nothing to take into acc01mt and that the "taking into account" language was no longer of 
any use in 2009 and thereafter. 
(2) The court's interpretation of the lease was done correctly according to general rules of 
contract interpretation. 
Essentially this case required the court to interpret the 1983 Lease. The Court found that 
most of the language relevant to the rent amount to be unambiguous and enforced it literally as 
written. Quail takes issue with this, insisting instead that the court simply ignore the language 
requiring that rent shall be 15% of market value and find instead that there has been a course of 
dealing establishing that the market value is only $15,000 and, further, must remain at that level 
(or go below that level). 
When faced with contlicting views on interpreting the language of an agreement a court 
has priorities to consider. These are set forth generally as follows: 
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§ 203. In the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, the following 
standards of preference are generally applicable: 
(a) an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawfuL and effective meaning to all 
the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, 
unlavvful, or of no effect; 
(b) express terms are given greater weight than course of performance, course of 
dealing, and usage of trade, course of performance is given greater weight than 
course of dealing or usage of trade, and course of dealing is given greater weight 
than usage of trade; 
(c) specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language: 
(d) separately negotiated or added terms are given greater weight than standardized 
terms or other terms not separately negotiated. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203 (1981). Of these priorities, the first priority in § 203(a) 
is probably all that is needed. The district court's interpretation gives a "reasonable, lawful, and 
effective meaning to all of the terms." Quails suggested interpretation does not. Quail suggests 
that the court ignore the prime directive of the lease agreement, which is that the rent must remain 
at 15% of market value, and focus only on the language that the parties shall "take into account" 
that the land value was originally agreed to be $15,000 per acre. However, Quail'S suggested 
interpretation leaves the primary requirement that the rent be 15% of the land value "of no effect," 
and thus Quail's interpretation must be rejected. 
The second priority in § 203(b) is also helpful. The court's interpretation relies on the 
express terms of the 1983 Lease. Quail's interpretation asks the court to elevate "course of 
performance" and "course of dealing" to a level that completely contradicts the express terms. 
The third priority of interpretation, § 203( c ),also supports the district court's interpretation. 
It states that a specific phrase, such as "rent shall be 15% ofland value," shall take precedent over 
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general language, such as the "take into account" language, which only gives guidelines on how to 
detennine the value of the land. The "take into account" language is vague and of little value to 
an appraiser or a court or even the parties in the effort to detennine fair market value. 
Thus, it is clear that the district court was well aware of the appropriate priorities in 
interpreting the lease and applied the priorities appropriately. 
(3) The "take into account" language is correctly seen, not as the main clause of the 1983 
Lease Agreement governing the amount of rent, but as precatory language that should not 
be elevated in importance above the provisions it was written to support. 
Contractual tenns are to be used in according to their natural and common meanings. 
Looking up the phrase "take into account" finds these definitions: 
Take someone or something into account: To remember to consider someone or 
something, such as "I'll try to take into account all the things that are important in a 
situation like this. 
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of American Idioms and Phrasal Verbs. In a different dictionary, the 
phrase is similarly defined: 
Take something or someone into account: To think about something or someone when 
you are making a decision or a judgment. "I hope they'll take her age into account when 
they're judging her work. They took into account that he'd never been in trouble before. 
Her book takes no account of recent research carried out in America. 
Cambridge Idioms Dictionary, 2nd ed. 
Thus, the use of the idiom "take into account" in a contract means to think about or 
consider something. It does not mean that the thing being taken into account is the primary factor 
in making a decision or a judgment. Indeed it is clear that the directive to "take into account" the 
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original land valuation is merely a suggestion, not binding language that invalidates the preceding 
paragraphs it was meant to support and give advice on. 
This type of language is obviously meant to be precatory, it supports other language and 
helps with understanding the parties' intent, but does not require mandatory or strict compliance. 
See Isaacson v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 95 Idaho 452, 454, 511 P.2d 269, 271 (1973). It is true 
that the word "precatory" is most typically used to describe language in wills and trust; however, 
precatory language is not usually put into contracts and leases. Nevertheless, the parties in 1983 
did use precatory language to advise on how they would like the land valued in the future. The 
court was correct, though, to not elevate this language to the high importance that Quail requests. 
The "take into account" language should not replace the main clause requiring rent to be at 15% of 
market value. 
F. It is inappropriate to Quail to use the failure to adjust the rent every three years as a 
"course of dealing" that would rewrite the unambiguous terms of the lease agreement. 
Quail seems to argue, without legal source, that a course of dealing can do away with one 
contract and replace it with another. This is not the law. As discussed above, course of dealing 
is one of the factors a court can use to help interpret the language of a contract and assist in 
understanding the parties' intent if a contractual clause is not clear. However, a course of dealing 
does not take priority over plain, unambiguous language, such as the lease's requirement that rent 
be 15% of land value. Restatement Contracts § 203(b). 
Moreover, Quail also distorts the rule limiting the types of course of dealing that could be 
considered by a court as it attempts to interpret ambiguous language. For example, in Idaho First 
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Nat. Bank v. David Steed and Associates, Inc., 121 Idaho 356, 825 P.2d 79 (1992), the court 
clarified that a course of dealings refers to prior dealings that help understand the meaning or intent 
of the contract and rejected an attempt to use subsequent course of dealings. In other words, a 
course of dealings prior to the 1983 Lease Agreement might shed light on the ambiguous language 
requiring the parties to "take into account" the original $15,000 valuation, or even a course of 
dealings subsequent, might shed light on the original intentions of the parties. Either way, 
conduct from before or after is only to be considered if it helps discern the intent of those who 
drafted and originally entered into a contract containing ambiguous language. Quail attempts to 
distort this contract interpretation principle by claiming that, by not adjusting the rent every three 
years, the parties created a new agreement with a fixed rent. That is simply not the law. 
There are really two problems with Quail's course of dealing argument. First, there is no 
relevant course of dealings. The court was not looking for evidence to interpret whether the 15% 
requirement still applied, the 15% language was unambiguous; instead the court was trying to 
understand what the "take into account" language meant, and specifically how to take the original 
$15,000 into account as part of the three year adjustment. Had the parties followed a particular 
pattern in how they took the $15,000 into account, it have might helped the court determine the 
drafter's intentions on the ambiguous language. Instead, nothing happened--there were no 
adjustments--and nothing was ever put in writing, as required. In deed there was no evidence that 
the parties ever even had a discussion about adjusting the land value. This absence of dealings is 
not a course of dealing. The failure to follow the instructions in the agreement does nothing to 
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help the court understand what the original parties meant by the "take into account" language. 
The other problem with Quail's analysis on course of dealing is that typically the same 
people who wTite an agreement will act under the agreement. If two people write an agreement, 
and then act a certain way, their actions may help explain an ambiguity in their agreement. Here 
different people took over managing the lease and there is no evidence they ever spoke about the 
"take into account" language with the original people who entered into the agreement. The 
non-action by those subsequently in charge of the lease, especially when the non-action was by 
mistake due to ignorance, does nothing to explain the intentions of the original parties. 
G. Brad Janoush's testimony was admissible in every regard and was highly relevant and 
necessary to the district court's decision. 
PMC retained Brad Janoush as an expert witness to appraise the property for the years 2007 
and 2010. Janoush was given a copy of the 1983 Lease and was asked to consider the language 
in paragraph 1.3 of the lease. Thus, the land was to be appraised "exclusive ofthe improvements 
on the premises" and at its "highest and best use." Tr. Vol. II, p. 51, L. 18; p. 53, L. 21. When 
questioned about the third guideline, the "take into account" language, Janoush testified that he did 
not take the original $15,000 valuation into account because he had no way to do that and felt it 
was best for the court to address that guideline. Likewise, since there were no preceding written 
valuations to take into account, Janoush also did not attempt to do that, and left the method of 
dealing with that issue to the judge. Tr. Vol. II, p. 54, L. 23. 
Janoush testified that the land's market value on January 27,2010 was $990,000. Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 61 L. 17. The land's value on January 27,2007 was $1,080,000. Tr. Vol. II, p. 60, L. 22. 
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Although the court opted not to allow rent payments to be increased as far back as 2007, the court 
did go back to 2010. The rent amount was determined by multiplying $990,000 times the 15% 
required by the 1983 lease agreement. Thus, Janoush' testimony was critical as the only 
evidence offered to assist the court in declaring \vhat the current land value was so that it could 
make the required adjustment and bring the rent amount back to 15% of the land value for the 2010 
to 2013 period. 
Quail claims Janoush's methodology is suspect. This is surprising considering his 
credentials as an appraiser. However, it becomes evident that Quail's criticism of the court's 
reliance on Janoush's appraisal is because the district court rejected Quail's notion that the 
"subjective valuation" of the property must be based solely on the "take into account" language 
and must result in an appraisal of $15,000, to match the 1983 value. The district court's 
methodology was suspect, says Quail, because it focused on the language requiring that the land be 
appraised at its "fair market value," even though that is exactly what was required by the 1983 
lease. 
Quail insists that the court should have ignored the fair market value and focus only on the 
"taking into account" guideline. This flies in the face of the lease's express language. The court 
correctly relied on Janoush's appraisal and on his testimony as to the value the land and determine 
the correct amount of the rent payment. 
Respondent Brief 39 
III. CONCLUSION 
The district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are correct and should be 
affirmed on appeal and the court's judgment of the amount of past due rent and the procedure for 
determining the future amount of rent should be enforced. 
DATED this -=-.:...:.....:=-- day of June, 2013. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
Kent L. Hawkins 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Kent L. Hawkins, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff/Respondent, in 
the above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing 
Respondent Brief was this day of June, 2013, served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 W. State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Respondent Brief 40 
D{l U.S. Mail 
U Hand Delivery 
U Overnight Mail 
U Facsimile 
(;{J U.S. Mail 
LJ Hand Delivery 
U Overnight Delivery 
LJ Telefax 
Kent L. Hawkins 
